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Abstract. We present a new set of reductions for derivations in natural deduction
that can extract witnesses from closed derivations of simply existential formulas
in Heyting Arithmetic (HA) plus the Excluded Middle Law restricted to simply
existential formulas (EM1), a system motivated by its interest in proof mining.
The reduction we have for classical logic are quite different from all existing ones.
They are inspired by the informal idea of learning by making falsifiable hypoth-
esis and checking them, and by the Interactive Realizability interpretation. We
extract the witnesses directly from derivations in HA+EM1 by reduction, without
encoding derivations by a realizability interpretation.
1 Introduction
It has been known since the seminal works of Go¨del and Kreisel that classical proofs of
simply existential statements have a computational content. Since 1990, we know that
they may be interpreted as functional programs with continuations [5]. A more recent
technique for extracting this content in the case of the sub-classical logic HA+EM1
(Heyting Arithmetic + Excluded Middle Law restricted to Σ01 formulas) is Interactive
Realizability [2], introduced by Berardi and de’Liguoro in [3, 4].
1.1 Interactive Realizability
Interactive realizability combines the ideas of realizability semantics for classical logic
with the ideas of monotonic learning. It extends Kreisel modified realizability for in-
tuitionistic logic by realizing EM1. This is accomplished with realizers that learn wit-
nesses for Σ01 formulas by trial and error. When evaluated, an interactive realizer may
fail to produce correct evidence for the statement it realizes. In particular it may fail
to provide a witness for an existential statement or to correctly decide a disjunction. In
this case, some error is found and the realizer provides a new piece of knowledge which
is added to a knowledge state. This knowledge state will be used when the interactive
realizer is evaluated again: if the state contains all the necessary knowledge then the
realizer will succeed and provide correct evidence. Otherwise it will fail again and a
new piece of knowledge will be added to the state. Berardi and Aschieri in [2] prove
by a continuity argument that this process converges, that is, an interactive realizer may
only fail a finite number of times before succeeding.
Traditional continuation-based techniques often extract algorithms that are obscure
and may fail to convey the intuitive ideas of the proof. Interactive realizability aims
to explain the use of continuations as a particular implementation of the more general
concept of learning. In order to reach this goal interactive realizers have the following
features:
– they realize statements directly without the need for a negative translation;
– they encode the proof faithfully, for instance avoiding blind searches for witnesses;
– when the excluded middle instances in the proof have a low logical complexity,
like EM1, interactive realizers use simpler constructs like states and exceptions to
handle the continuation-passing nature of the computational content of classical
proofs.
The goal of this paper is to express thorough reductions the idea of trial and error from
Interactive Realizability.
1.2 Witness extraction
In proof theory there are reductions that express the computational interpretation we
give to logical connectives, quantifiers and, in the case of arithmetic, induction. Proofs
in intuitionistic logic are shown to produce a witness for existential statements: any
proof can be to normal form, in which no more reductions are possible, and in a normal
proof of an existential statement a witness always appears in a predictable location. We
want to obtain the same result for proofs of semi-decidable statements in intuitionistic
logic augmented with EM1 and reduction rules inspired by a trial-and-error interpreta-
tion.
We work in Heyting Arithmetic (HA) extended with EM1, which is weaker than
classical arithmetic but strong enough to prove non-trivial non-constructive results: for
instance the fact that every function f : N Ñ N has a minimum. By modifying the
standard reductions for Heyting Arithmetic (see [6]), we show that normal proofs of
existential statements in HA ` EM1 produce a witness1, as they do in the intuitionistic
case.
The fact that classical arithmetic is a conservative extension of HA for Π02 state-
ments is well known and the fact that we can extract witnesses from classical proofs of
Σ01 statements follows immediately. However proofs of these results usually employ the
Go¨del-Gentzen negative translation combined with variants of Kreisel’s modified real-
izability semantics or Friedman’s translation. Here, by purely proof theoretical means,
we prove a slightly weaker result without resorting to negative translations and using
reductions justified in terms of Interactive Realizability.
1.3 Future work
We shall prove in a future paper that our reductions are strongly normalizing. In this
paper we prove that, if we have normalization, then all derivations of simply existential
statements compute a witness by a method we describe as trial-and-error.
1 Under suitable assumptions on the proof.
2 A formal system for Intuitionistic Arithmetic
In this section we recount some basic features of Intuitionistic Arithmetic HA: for a
more throughout account see [8].
The language of HA is a first-order language with connectives ^,_,Ñ and quan-
tifiers @ and D. As usual we say that a formula is closed if it has no free variables and
that a rule is atomic if its premisses and its conclusion can only be atomic formulas2.
The language of HA includes:
– variables x, y, z, . . . for natural numbers,
– function symbols for all the primitive recursive functions,
– the equality binary predicate symbol “,
– arithmetical terms (metavariables t, u, v), atomic formulas (P) and formulas (A, B,C),
defined inductively as usual.
In particular we assume that we have the function symbols 0, succ.
A numeral is any term of the form succnp0q, for some n P N. We assume having a set
of algebraic reduction rules for primitive recursive functions. If, for some g : Nn Ñ N
and h : Nn`2 Ñ N, f denotes the primitive recursive pn`1q-ary function defined by the
equations:
f p0, x1, . . . , xnq “ gpx1, . . . , xnq,
f psuccpxq, x1, . . . , xnq “ hpx, f px, x1, . . . , xnq, x1, . . . , xnq,
then we add the reductions:
f p0, x1, . . . , xnq Ñ gpx1, . . . , xnq,
f psuccpxq, x1, . . . , xnq Ñ hpx, f px, x1, . . . , xnq, x1, . . . , xnq.
This reduction system is strongly normalizing and has an unique normal form. Thus
any closed normal term is a numeral. We reduce terms inside formulas and we consider
two formulas equal when they have the same normal form.
We assume that we have a recursive set of atomic rules that is correct (that is, it
derives true statements only) and contains:
– the first-order axioms and rules for equality,
– the compatibility rule for equality and functions,
– the Ex Falso Quodlibet rule for atomic formulas P:
KKE P
where K denotes the 0-ary relation that never holds;
– the rules for zero and the successor functions:
succpxq “ 0
K
succpxq “ succpyq
x “ y
2 An instance of the induction rule can have atomic premisses and conclusion, but this is not
required in general, so the induction rule is not atomic.
The non-atomic inference rules are just those of minimal first-order logic, that is, one
elimination and one introduction rule for each of the logical connectives and quantifiers
and the induction rule, which we define later. Moreover we consider A syntactic sugar
for A Ñ K.
Note that minimal logic extended with the Ex Falso Quodlibet rule for atomic for-
mulas yields full intuitionistic logic.
Since our reduction technique could conceivably be used in other first-order theo-
ries, we isolate some general assumptions on atomic formulas and rules that we need
for our results to hold:
– closed atomic formulas are decidable,
– any true closed atomic formula has an atomic derivation,
– atomic rules do not discharge assumptions,
– atomic rules do not bind term variables3.
The first two assumption are very reasonable in a constructive setting such as arith-
metic where we expect to have decidability at least for atomic formulas4. The other two
seems also reasonable for any first-order theory. All of them are satisfied in HA. These
assumption are reasonable in a constructive setting and they are satisfied in Heyting
Arithmetic
We assumed that any true closed atomic formula has an atomic derivation. For con-
venience we add atomic rules for proving them in one step. Let P be a closed atomic
formula. If P is true then we add the atomic axiom:
AI P
Otherwise if P is false we add the atomic rule:
P
AE
K
In order to work on the structure of derivations we need suitable notation and ter-
minology. We represent derivations as upward growing trees of formulas and we make
a distinction between a formula (risp. rule) and its occurrences (risp. instances) in a
derivation (see ?? for a more precise description). We define assumptions and open
assumptions as usual in natural deduction, see [7], page 23.
3 The standard reductions
In standard reductive proof theory for natural deduction, several reductions are intro-
duced: proper reductions, permutative reductions, immediate simplifications and a re-
duction for the induction rule (see [6]). A derivation is said to be fully normal when
none of these reductions can be performed on it. For our purposes fully normal deriva-
tions are not required, so we introduce only the proper reductions and the induction
reduction.
In an instance of an elimination rule, the premiss containing the connective or quan-
tifier that is being eliminated is called the major premiss; the other premisses are called
the minor premisses. We always display the major premiss in the leftmost position.
3 The precise meaning of this will be made precise later.
4 However they may very well fail in set theory, for instance with the inclusion predicate.
3.1 Proper reductions
Consider a derivation in which a formula occurrence a is both the conclusion of an
introduction rule instance α and the major premiss of an elimination rule instance β.
Then we can derive the conclusion of β directly by removing α and β and rearranging
the derivations of the premisses of α and of the minor premisses of β (if any). Note that
α and β must be instances of an introduction rule and an elimination rule for the same
logical connective, since the formula introduced by α is the same formula eliminated by
β. Therefore for each logical connective we have a different type of proper reduction.
They are listed in ??.
Fig. 1. The proper reductions.
^´red
Π1
A1
Π2
A2
^I αA1 ^ A2
^E βAi
^´red
ÝÝÝÑ Πi
Ai
_´red
Π
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rA1sα
Π1
B
rA2sα
Π2
B
_E αB
_´red
ÝÝÝÑ
Π
Ai
Πi
B
Ñ´red
rAsα
Π1
B
Ñ I αA Ñ B
Π2
A
Ñ E B
Ñ´red
ÝÝÝÝÑ
Π2
A
Π1
B
@´red
Π
@I
@x. A
@E
Arx ≔ ts
@´red
ÝÝÝÑ Πrx ≔ ts
Arx ≔ ts
D´red
Π1
Arx ≔ ts
DI
Dx. A
rArx ≔ yssα
Π2
B
DE αB
D´red
ÝÝÝÑ
Π1
Arx ≔ ts
Π2ry ≔ ts
B
3.2 Induction reduction
Consider the induction rule schema Ind in the following form:
Π1
Arx ≔ 0s
rAsα
Π2
Arx ≔ succpxqs
Ind αArx ≔ ts
We call t the main term of the induction. An instance α of the Ind rule can be reduced
when the main term t in its conclusion Arx ≔ ts is either 0 or succpuq for some term u.
Then if t “ 0 we can reduce α to:
Π1
Arx ≔ 0s
and if t “ succpuq as:
Π1
Arx ≔ 0s
rAsβ
Π2
Arx ≔ succpxqs
Ind βArx ≔ us
Π2rx ≔ us
Arx ≔ succpuqs
We call this conditional reduction Ind´red. It is easy to see that this reduction is “un-
raveling” the induction. When u is a numeral n, that is, a term of the form succn, we
can apply the Ind´red reduction repeatedly (n times) until we remove all occurrences
of the Ind rule and get:
Π1
Arx ≔ 0s
Π2rx ≔ 0s
Arx ≔ 1s
Π2rx ≔ 1s
Arx ≔ 2s
...
Arx ≔ ns
4 The Witness Extracting Reductions
In this section we introduce an inference rule that is equivalent to a restricted version
of the excluded middle axiom schema and two reductions involving this new rule. The
first one, the Wit´red reduction, is inspired to Interactive Realizability and it will be
instrumental in converting classical derivations into constructive ones. The second one
is a permutative reduction and is needed later for technical reasons.
4.1 The EM1 rule
The excluded middle axiom schema is the following:
EM A_ A
where A is any formula. In intuitionistic logic with EM we can derive the double
negation elimination. This shows that HA extended with EM is equivalent to classi-
cal (Peano) arithmetic PA.
We restrict the EM axiom to Π01 formulas and we rewrite it in an equivalent way, as
in [1]:
EM1 @x. P _ Dx.  P
where P is an atomic formula.
For convenience we replace the EM1 axiom schema with the equivalent EM1 rule:
r@x. Psα
...
A
r Prx ≔ yssα
...
AEM1 αA
where the variable y does not occur in A nor in any open assumption that A depends on
except occurrences of the assumption  Prx ≔ ys (as in the DE rule).
The EM1 rule can be easily derived by the EM1 axiom by means of the _E and DE
rules and it can easily derive the EM1 axiom.
The derivations are given in ??.
In the following we refer to the assumption @x. P in the derivation of the leftmost
premiss of the EM1 rule as the universal assumption and to the assumption  Prx ≔ ys
in the derivation of the rightmost premiss as the existential assumption.
The universal assumption @x. P is a Π01 formula and thus negatively decidable,
meaning that a finite piece of evidence is enough to prove it false: a counterexample, a
natural number m such that Prx ≔ ms does not hold. Moreover, if we know that it is
false, then a counterexample exists and we can find it in a finite time, in the worst case
by means of a blind search through all the natural numbers.
On the other hand, in order to prove the universal assumption, we need a possibly
infinite evidence, namely, we may need to check Prx ≔ ms for all natural numbers m
and this cannot be effectively done (at least when we have no information on P).
The existential assumption  Prx ≔ ys is not actually a existential formula. How-
ever it is easy to see that it takes the place of the assumption discharged by the DE rule.
For more details you can see how the two rules are related in ??.
We say that we can prove the existential assumption true by showing a witness,
namely a number m such that  Prx ≔ ms. Thus the existential assumption behaves
as if it were positively decidable: when it is true, we have a terminating algorithm to
find the finite evidence needed to prove it. However, when it false, we have no way to
effectively decide if it is false.
Note that a counterexample m for the universal assumption @x. P is a witness for
the existential assumption since in that case  Prx ≔ ms holds.
4.2 Witness reduction
Consider a derivation Π ending with an instance α of the EM1 rule for the atomic
formula P:
r@x. Psα
Π1
A
r Prx ≔ yssα
Π2
AEM1 αA
A priori we do not know any counterexample to the universal assumption (we do
not even know whether it holds or not), so we begin by looking at how the assumption is
used in Π1. In Π1, consider all the instances β1, . . . , βn of the @E rule whose premiss is
an occurrence of the universal assumption @x. P and whose conclusion is the occurrence
of a closed (atomic) formula:
r@x. Psα
@E β1Prx ≔ t1s
...
. . .
r@x. Psα
@E βnPrx ≔ tns
...
These represent the concrete instances of the universal assumption that are used to de-
rive A in Π1. Since the conclusions of β1, . . . , βn are closed atomic formulas they are
decidable. Therefore we can derive the true concrete instances directly with the atomic
axiomAI instead of deducing them from the universal assumption. We distinguish two
cases.
– If Prx ≔ tis is true for all i we replace each βi with the atomic axiom for Prx ≔ tis:
r@x. Psα
@E βiPrx ≔ tis
...
{
AI
Prx ≔ tis
...
We call this new derivation Π 11.
Now two situations are possible: either Π1 needs the universal assumption only to
deduce the concrete instances β1, . . . , βn or not.
‚ The first case happens when Π 11 contains no more occurrences of the universal
assumption discharged by α, that is, the universal assumption only occurs in
Π1 as the premiss of β1, . . . , βn. In this case Π 11 is a self-contained derivation of
A and we can replace the whole Π with Π 11.
‚ Otherwise Π 11 still contains some occurrence of the universal assumption. Then
Π 11 does need the universal assumption itself and not just some concrete in-
stances of it. In this case we can only replace Π1 with Π 11 in Π , but we cannot
eliminate the EM1 rule instance α from the derivation.
– Otherwise there is some i such that Prx ≔ tis is false. This means that the universal
assumption itself is false, since we have found the counterexample ti. Moreover ti
is a witness for the existential assumption, meaning that we can replace y with ti
in Π2 and all the occurrences of the assumption  Prx ≔ ys with a derivation of
 Prx ≔ ts:
r Prx ≔ tissα
...
{
rPrx ≔ tissβ
1
i
AE
KÑ I β1i Prx ≔ tis
...
We call this new derivation Π 12.
Note that in this case we replace all the occurrences of the existential assumption in
Π2 and thus Π 12 is self-contained derivation of A. Therefore we can replace Π with
Π 12.
We call this reduction Wit´red.
The gist of the Wit´red reduction is that we look for counterexamples to the univer-
sal assumption in Π1. If we do not find one then we have checked that all the concrete
instances of the universal assumption hold. Moreover if Π1 uses the universal assump-
tion exclusively to deduce these concrete instances, then we get a direct derivation of
A without using the EM1 rule. On the other hand if we find a counterexample then we
know that we can put it in Π2 and get another direct derivation of A.
In some sense we have a procedure to decide which one of the subderivation of
the EM1 rule is the effective one, Note that this procedure fails when we do not find
counterexamples to the universal assumption but we cannot completely eliminate its
occurrences from Π1. Our main result can be thought of as the proof that, when the
conclusion of a derivation is simply existential, this “failure” of the procedure does not
happen. The whole reduction is summarized in ??.
4.3 Permutative reduction for EM1
The permutative reduction for EM1 is defined in the same way as the permutative re-
duction for the_E rule, that is, when the conclusion of a EM1 rule instance is the major
premiss of an elimination rule instance ˚E:
r@x. Psγ
Π1
A
r Prx ≔ yssγ
Π2
AEM1 γA ¯Π˚E B
reduces to:
r@x. Psα
Π1
A ¯Π˚E B
r Prx ≔ yssα
Π2
A ¯Π˚E BEM1 αB
where ¯Π stands for the derivations of the remaining minor premisses of β if any. We
denote this reduction as EM1´perm. More explicitly, we can define a permutative re-
duction for each elimination rule, see ?? and ??.
This reduction moves elimination rule instances from “outside” or “below” to “in-
side” or “above” an EM1 rule instance. This is useful because an EM1 rule instance
may happen in between an introduction rule instance and an elimination rule instance,
preventing a proper reduction from taking place.
Fig. 2. The Wit´red reduction possible outcomes.
Wit´red
r@x. Psα
@E β1Prx ≔ t1s
r@x. Psα
@E βnPrx ≔ tns
r@x. Psα
Π1
A
rPrx ≔ yssα
Π2
AEM1 αA
An derivation ending with an EM1 rule instance reduces to:
AI
Prx ≔ t1s
AI
Prx ≔ tns r@x. Ps
α
Π1
A
rPrx ≔ yssα
Π2
AEM1 αA
when all Prx ≔ tis hold and some occurrences of the universal assumption remain.
AI
Prx ≔ t1s
AI
Prx ≔ tns
Π1
A
when all Prx ≔ tis hold and no occurrence of the universal assumption remains.
rPrx ≔ tissβ
1
AE
K
Ñ I β1
 Prx ≔ tis
Π2
A
when some Prx ≔ tis does not hold.
5 Witness Extraction
In this section we prove the witness extraction theorem, that shows how we can extract
witnesses from suitable classical derivations in HA`EM1, as we can do for intuitionistic
derivations in HA.
In order to state and prove our results we need to keep track of free term variables
in a derivations, since both the Ind´red and the Wit´red reductions can only be per-
formed when certain terms and formulas are closed.
We need to define when a variable is free in a derivation.
Definition 1 (Free term variables). We say that a rule instance α binds a term variable
that occurs free in the derivation Π of a premiss of α in the following cases:
– α is an instance of the @I rule and binds the variable x in the formula occurrences
in the derivation of its premiss:
Π
A@I α
@x. A
– α is an instance of the DE rule and binds the variable y in the formula occurrences
in the derivation of its rightmost premiss:
Dx. A
rArx ≔ yssα
Π
B
DE αB
– α is an instance of the Ind rule and binds the variable x in the formula occurrences
in the derivation of its rightmost premiss:
Arx ≔ 0s
rAsα
Π
Arx ≔ succpxqs
Ind αArx ≔ ts
– α is an instance of the EM1 rule and binds the variable y in the formula occurrences
in the derivation of its rightmost premiss:
r@x. Psα
...
B
r Prx ≔ yssα
Π
BEM1 αB
We say that a term variable occurrence is free in a derivation when the term variable
occurs free in a formula occurrence in the derivation and is not bound by any rule
instance. A derivation is closed if it has no free term variable nor open assumption.
Note that no reduction introduces free term variables in a derivation.
Since a derivation is a tree, it makes sense to give the definition of branch. Principal
branches are branches of a derivation that contains only major premisses of elimination
and EM1 rule instances.
Definition 2 (Principal branch). A branch in a derivation Π is a sequence of formula
occurrences a0, . . . , an in Π such that:
– a0 is a top formula occurrence, that is, a0 is either an assumption or the conclusion
of an atomic axiom;
– ai and ai`1 are respectively a premiss and the conclusion of the same rule instance
αi`1, for all 0 ď i ă n;
– an is the conclusion of Π .
A branch is principal if, for all 0 ď i ă n such that αi is an elimination or EM1 rule
instance, ai is the major (leftmost) premiss of αi.
We use the variables ζ, η for branches.
In order to study the properties of normal proofs we only need to consider the struc-
ture of principal branches. A head-cut is the lowest point of a principal branch where a
reduction is possible.
Definition 3 (Head-cut). The head-cut of a principal branch ζ “ a1, . . . , an is the for-
mula occurrence ai with the maximum index i such that one of the following holds:
– ai is the conclusion of an elimination rule instance αi, ai´1 is the major premiss
of αi and the conclusion of an introduction rule instance αi´1; when αi´1 is a ^I
rule instance we also require that ai´2 is an occurrence of the same formula as ai
(proper reductions);
– ai is the conclusion of an Ind rule instance αi, whose main term is either 0 or
succpuq for some term u (Ind´red reduction);
– ai is the conclusion of an EM1 rule instance α and either ai´1 is derived with-
out using the assumption discharged by α or a0 is an occurrence of the universal
assumption discharged by α and a1 is the occurrence of a closed atomic formula
(Wit´red reduction);
– ai is the conclusion of an elimination rule instance α and ai´1 is the conclusion of
an EM1 rule instance (EM1´perm reductions).
If such an i exists we say that there is a head-cut along the branch ζ.
This definition is the result of a analysis of the conditions that must be met in order
to perform one of the reductions we have listed. In particular note how, in the condi-
tion given for the Wit´red reduction, the fact that a1 is atomic implies that a1 is the
conclusion of a @E rule instance, as we assumed in defining Wit´red.
We shall show that, with suitable assumptions, we can perform the Wit´red reduc-
tion as needed in order to extract a witness from a derivation. One of these assumptions
is that the conclusion of the derivation is “simple” enough, as we define next.
Definition 4 (Simple Formulas). We say that a formula is simply existential (resp.
universal) when it is Dx. P (resp. @x. P) for some atomic formula P.
We say that a formula is simple when it is closed and atomic or simply existential.
In the following we consider the EM1 and Ind rules to be neither elimination nor
introduction rules and we give them special treatment.
As we shall show later, principal branches beginning with an open assumption have
particular structure in normal derivations: they begin with a sequence of elimination rule
instances, followed by atomic and EM1 rule instances and they end with introduction
and EM1 rule instances. Any of these parts may be missing.
Definition 5 (Open normal form). A principal branch a0, . . . , an is said to be in open
normal form when there exist three natural numbers nE , nA and nI such that nE`nAnI “
n and:
– a0 is the occurrence of an open assumption in Π ,
– ai is the conclusion of an elimination rule instance for 0 ă i ď nE ,
– ai is the conclusion of an atomic or EM1 rule instance for nE ă i ď nE ` nA,
– anE`nA`1 is the conclusion of an introduction rule instance5,
– ai is the conclusion of an introduction or EM1 rule instance for nE ` nA ă i ď n,
nE , nA and nI are the number of elimination, atomic or EM1, introduction or EM1 rule
instances, respectively.
We can now prove our main result: closed normal derivations of simply existential
formulas in HA ` EM1 can be reduced to derivations ending with an introduction rule
instance. Derivations in HA have a similar property. The theorem we are going to prove
holds for derivations that are concrete enough, namely they are: self-contained (without
open assumptions), concrete (without open term variables) and with an effective con-
clusion (a simply existential formula). The proof is split into several lemmas, whose
proofs are given in ??.
In the first lemma we show that, in a derivation of a simply existential with no free
term variables, a simply universal assumption is followed by a closed atomic formula.
This will be used later to prove that we can perform the Wit´red reduction on universal
assumption of an EM1 rule instance.
Lemma 1. Let ζ “ a0, . . . , an be a principal branch in open normal form in a deriva-
tion Π in HA`EM1, with nE , nA and nI defined as in ??. Let A0, . . . , An be the formulas
a0, . . . , an are occurrences of. Then the following statements hold:
1. Ai is a non-atomic subformula of An for all nE ` nA ă i ď n;
2. if some ai is the conclusion of an introduction rule instance, then Ai is a subformula
of An;
Moreover assume that An is a simple formula. Then:
3. if a term variable x is free in some Ai, then x is free in Π;
4. if some Ai is simply universal, then ai is the premiss of a @E rule instance;
5. if Π has no free term variables and Ai is simply universal, then Ai`1 is a closed
atomic formula.
In the following lemma we show how we can apply the Wit´red reduction.
5 Since EM1 rule instances can appear intermingled with both atomic and introduction rule
instances, in the definition we require that anE`nA`1 be the conclusion of an introduction rule,
so that nA and nI are uniquely determined.
Lemma 2 (EM1 reduction). Let Π be a derivation in HA ` EM1 with no free term
variables. Assume that Π ends with an EM1 rule instance α whose conclusion is an
occurrence of a simple formula. Assume that the derivation Π 1 of the leftmost premiss
of α has a principal branch ζ in open normal form. Then at least one of the following
occurs:
1. Π has a head-cut or a non-normal term along a principal branch,
2. Π has a principal branch in open normal form.
Proof. Let ζ “ a0, . . . , an and let A0, . . . , An be the formulas a0, . . . , an are occurrences
of. Let a be the conclusion of Π and of the EM1 rule instance α:
rAa00 s
ζ
Π 1
Aann
...
AnEM1 αAan
Note that we can extend ζ to η “ a0, . . . , an, a and η is a principal branch of Π .
If a0 is not discharged by α, then η is a principal branch in open normal form and
thus we get the statement. Otherwise, a0 is discharged by α, meaning that A0 is the
universal assumption of the EM1 instance. We can apply (5) of ?? to η, since a0 is
simply universal, a is simply existential and Π has no free term variables.
Then a1 is a closed atomic formula and we can perform the Wit´red reduction, that
is, there is a head-cut along the principal branch η of Π and we can conclude. [\
The following lemma shows how to handle Ind rule instances.
Lemma 3 (Induction normalization). Let Π be a derivation in HA`EM1 ending with
an Ind rule instance. Then at least one of the following holds:
1. Π has a head-cut or a non-normal term along a principal branch,
2. Π contains a free term variable.
The following lemma can be thought of as a weak result on the structure of deriva-
tions.
Lemma 4 (Structure of Normal Form). Let Π be a derivation in HA`EM1. Then at
least one of the following holds:
1. Π has a head-cut or a non-normal term along a principal branch;
2. Π contains a free term variable;
3. Π has a principal branch in open normal form;
4. Π ends with an introduction rule instance;
5. Π is atomic (only atomic formulas occur in Π);
6. Π ends with an EM1 instance and its conclusion is not simple.
Our main theorem is now an easy corollary of the previous lemma.
Theorem 1 (Witness Extraction). Let Π be a derivation of a simple formula A in
HA` EM1. Assume that:
1. Π has no principal branch with a head-cut or a non-normal term;
2. Π contains no free term variable;
3. Π has no open assumptions;
Then Π is either atomic or ends with a DI rule instance. In particular, if Π is closed,
normal and A is simply existential then Π ends with an introduction.
Note that we did not prove that the normalization of a derivation is convergent: this
shall be the focus of a future paper. For the moment we just assume that the reduction of
a derivation must stop after a finite number of steps and produces a derivation without
head-cuts. Under this assumption, ?? shows that our proof reduction can extract a wit-
ness from the derivation of a closed formula Dx. P, which can be found in the premise
of the DI rule instance at the end of the normalized derivation, by the definition of the
DI rule.
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A Appendix
A.1 Formula occurrences and rule instances
A formula can occur more than once in a derivation. While these occurrences are clearly
distinct in a tree-like representation, in order to avoid confusion when referring to them
in the text special care must be taken. Thus we make a distinction between formulas and
formula occurrences, or simply occurrences, which we label with a, b, c. In a derivation,
formula occurrences are arranged following the patterns given by the inference rules.
As with formulas, we distinguish between rules and rule instances, or simply instances,
which we label with α, β, γ. We write a derivation Π as follows:
Π1
Bb1
rCsβ
Π2
Bb2
rulename αAa
The only occurrence of the formula A is labeled a, while B occurs two times, with
distinct labels b1 and b2. a is the conclusion of an instance, labeled α, of an inference
rule named rulename. a1 and a2 are the premisses of α. We also say that a is the con-
clusion of the whole derivation Π . With Π1 and Π2 we denote two subderivations (as
in subtree) of Π . We distinguish subderivations by their conclusion, so we say that Πi
is the (sub)derivation of ai for i “ 1, 2. By writing rCsβ in square brackets above
Π2, we make explicit that Π2 may contain occurrences of the assumption C, which is
discharged by some undisplayed rule instance β.
A.2 Equivalence between the EM1 axiom and the EM1 rule
We show how to derive the EM1 rule from the EM1 axiom and vice versa. The EM1
rule is derived by an _E rule instance, whose major premiss is an instance of the EM1
axiom and whose rightmost assumption is the major premiss of an DE instance:
EM1
p@x. Aq _ pDx.  Aq
r@x. Asα
...
C
rDx.  Asα
r Arx ≔ yssβ
...
C
DE βC
_E αC
On the other hand, the EM1 axiom can be derived from the EM1 rule by two _I in-
stances:
r@x. Asα
_I
p@x. Aq _ pDx.  Aq
r Arx ≔ yssα
DI
Dx.  A_I
p@x. Aq _ pDx.  Aq
EM1 α
p@x. Aq _ pDx.  Aq
A.3 Proofs
In this subsection we list the proofs of the lemmas.
Proof of ??.
Proof. (2) follows immediately from (1). We need (2) to prove (3) and (4). Then, by (3)
and (4), we prove (5). Here are the proofs.
1. We proceed by induction on nI .
– If nI “ 0, the thesis holds vacuously.
– If nI “ 1, we need to prove the statement just for i “ nE `nA`1 “ n and thus
an is the conclusion of an introduction rule instance by ??. This means that An
is not atomic. Obviously it is also a subformula of itself so we are done.
– Otherwise, let nI ą 1.
Consider the subderivation Π 1 of Π ending with an´1 and its principal branch
ζ1 “ a0, . . . , an´1. ζ
1 is in open normal form in Π 1, with n1E “ nE , n
1
A “ nA and
n1I “ nI ´ 1. Then, by inductive hypothesis, for all nE ` nA ă i ď n ´ 1, Ai is
a non-atomic subformula of An´1.
By ??, Π ends with an introduction or EM1 rule instance α. In both cases An´1
is a subformula of An, since an´1 is the premiss of α and an is its conclusion.
Thus for all nE ` nA ă i ď n, Ai is a subformula of An. Moreover since An´1
is non-atomic then An is too.
2. If ai is the conclusion of an introduction rule instance then nE ` nA ă i ď n by ??.
Thus we conclude by (1).
3. We show that x is not bound by any rule instance and thus is free in Π . The only
rule that binds a variable above a major premiss, and thus the only rule that can bind
a variable in a principal branch, is the @I rule. Now assume that a @I rule instance
occur along ζ with conclusion a j. By the previous statement (2), A j is a subformula
of An. This yields a contradiction because by assumption An is simple and A j is
universally quantified since a j is the conclusion of a @I rule instance.
4. We show that ai is the premiss of a @E rule instance because no other alternative is
possible.
– ai cannot be the premiss of an atomic rule instance, since we assumed that Ai
is simply universal and thus not atomic.
– ai cannot be the premiss of an introduction rule instance, since in that case
Ai`1 is a subformula of An by (2). Therefore a simply universal formula Ai is a
subformula of a simple formula An, which is a contradiction.
– Finally ai cannot be the premiss of an EM1 rule instance. More precisely as-
sume that ai is followed by exactly j ą 0 instances of the EM1 rule. Then ai` j
is the conclusion of the last EM1 rule instance α and Ai` j is the same formula
as Ai, in particular Ai` j is simply universal. By definition of open normal form,
EM1 rule instances can only be followed by introduction, atomic or EM1 rule
instances. Since we assumed that there are exactly j instances of the EM1 rule,
ai` j is the premiss of either an atomic or introduction rule instance. Then we
are in one of the previous cases and we have a contradiction.
Then ai can only be the premiss of an elimination rule instance and, being Ai simply
universal, it must be an instance of the @E rule.
5. By (4) we known that ai`1 is the conclusion of a @E rule instance whose premiss
is simply universal. Therefore Ai`1 is an atomic formula. If Ai`1 has a free term
variable, Π has too by (3). Since we assumed that Π has no free term variable, Ai`1
must be closed. Therefore Ai`1 is a closed atomic formula. [\
Proof of ??.
Proof. Let α be the Ind rule instanceΠ ends with and let its conclusion be an occurrence
a of some formula Arx ≔ ts. If a has a free term variable x then x is free in Π too and we
are done. If t is not normal then all principal branches6 in Π have a non-normal term.
6 Since all branches of Π end with its conclusion.
Otherwise t is a closed normal term and thus it is either 0 or succpuq for some term u
and e we can apply the Ind´red reduction, meaning that any principal branch of Π has
a head cut. [\
Proof of ??.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of the derivation Π , that is, we assume
that the statement holds for all subderivations of Π and we prove that it holds for the
whole derivation.
Let α be the last rule instance in Π . If α in an introduction rule instance the statement
is satisfied and we are done.
If α is an Ind rule instance then we get the statement by applying ?? to Π .
Then we only need to understand what happens when α is an elimination, an atomic
or an EM1 rule instance. Note that the only case in which α has no premisses is when α
is an atomic axiom. If this happens then Π is atomic (it is just the conclusion of α) and
the statement is satisfied.
Otherwise α has one or more (when α is atomic) major premisses. Let Π 1 be the
derivation of any one of the major premisses of α. Any principal branch ζ of Π 1 can
be extended to a branch η of Π , by appending the conclusion of Π . η is principal too
because Π 1 is the subderivation of a major premiss of α. We shall use this fact often in
the following.
By inductive hypothesis Π 1 satisfies the statement, so we proceed by considering all
the possible cases.
1. Π 1 has a head-cut or a non-normal term along a principal branch ζ. As we noted ζ
can be extended to a principal branch of Π with the same head-cut or non-normal
term, so Π satisfies the statement and we are done.
2. Π 1 contains a free term variable.
There are four rules that can bind term variables: the @I, DE, Ind and EM1 rules.
Since the cases when α is an introduction or Ind rule instance have been taken
care of already and since the DE and EM1 rules can only bind term variables in the
derivation of its minor premiss, any free term variable in Π 1 is free in Π too. Thus
Π satisfies the statement.
3. Π 1 has a principal branch ζ “ a0, . . . , an in open normal form. Let η be the principal
branch of Π extending ζ.
rAa00 s
ζ
Π 1
Aann . . .EM1| ˚ E|A αA
Note that elimination rule instances do not discharge assumptions in their leftmost
subderivation and atomic rule instances do not discharge assumptions in general.
Then, when α is either an elimination or atomic rule instance, the assumption a0 is
still open in Π and we have the following cases depending on how which rule an
is the conclusion of. Note that since ζ is in open normal form, an cannot be an Ind
instance. Thus we have the following cases:
an is the conclusion of
ELIM ATOM INTRO EM1
α
ELIM EXT NO CUT PERM
ATOM EXT EXT NO NO/EXT
EXT η begins with the open assumption a0 followed by elimination and atomic rule
instances, so Π satisfies the statement;
NO this is never the case since, in a principal branch, an elimination (risp. atomic)
rule instance cannot follow an atomic (risp. introduction) rule instance, because
the major premiss (risp. conclusion) of an elimination (risp. introduction) rule
instance is not atomic and thus cannot be the conclusion (risp. premiss) of an
atomic rule instance;
CUT α is an elimination rule instance and its major premiss is the conclusion of an
introduction rule instance, thus η ends with a head-cut and again Π satisfies the
statement;
PERM when a major premiss of α is the conclusion of an EM1 rule instance we can
apply the EM1´perm reduction, thus η ends with a head-cut and Π satisfies
the statement;
NO/EXT we have two cases depending on the nI of ζ:
nI ą 0 then, by (1) of ??, we have that an is an occurrence of a non atomic formula
and thus α cannot be an atomic rule instance;
nI “ 0 in this case η is in open normal form and thus Π satisfies the statement.
On the other hand, if α is an EM1 rule instance then we can apply ?? to Π (since we
can safely assume that Π contains no free term variables) and we get the statement.
4. Π 1 ends with an introduction rule instance β. Then the conclusion b of β cannot be
atomic and since it is a premiss of α, α cannot be atomic either. Therefore α must
be either an elimination or an EM1 rule instance.
If α is an elimination then there is a head-cut along a principal branch going through
b so Π satisfies the statement.
...?I β
Bb . . .?E αAa
If α is an EM1 rule instance then a and b are both occurrences of the formula A.
If A is not simple then Π satisfies the statement. Otherwise we assume that A is
simple: since A cannot be atomic (it occurs as the conclusion of the introduction
rule instance β) A must be Dx. P for some atomic formula P and β must be an DI
rule instance. Then we are in the following situation:
Π2
ADI β
Dx. Pb
...
Dx. PEM1 α
Dx. Pa
where Π2 is the derivation of the premiss of β. Again note that principal branches
of Π2 extend to principal branches of Π 1 by appending b.
By inductive hypothesis Π2 satisfies the statement, so we proceed by considering
all the possible cases.
(a) Π2 has a head-cut or a non-normal term along a principal branch. Then Π 1 does
too and we are in the previously solved case labeled 1.
(b) Π2 contains a free term variable. Since DI does not bind free term variables, Π 1
does too and we are in the previously solved case labeled 2.
(c) Π2 has a principal branch ζ in open normal form. Since DI does not discharge
open assumptions, Π 1 does too and we are in the previously solved case labeled
3.
(d) Π2 ends with an introduction rule instance. This cannot happen because b is an
atomic formula occurrence.
(e) Π2 is atomic. The assumption discharged by α from its leftmost subderivation
is not atomic, thus it cannot occur in Π2 since Π2 is atomic. Therefore we can
apply the Wit´red reduction meaning that there is a head-cut at the end of the
principal branches of Π 1 and we are in the previously solved case labeled 1.
(f) Π2 ends with an EM1 instance and its conclusion is not simple. This cannot
happen because we assumed that A is simple and b is an occurrence of A.
5. Π 1 is atomic. In this case one of major premisses of α is atomic, so α cannot be an
elimination rule instance and must be either an EM1 or atomic rule instance.
– If α is an EM1 rule instance then it is redundant: the assumption discharged by
α from its leftmost subderivation is not atomic, thus it cannot occur in Π 1 since
Π 1 is atomic whose premisses are atomic formula occurrences. Therefore we
can apply the Wit´red reduction to α, meaning that there is a head-cut at the
end of the principal branches of Π and thus Π satisfies the statement.
– Otherwise, if α is an atomic rule instance, consider the other subderivations of
its major premisses. If they are all atomic then Π is atomic too and it satis-
fies the statement. Otherwise there is a major premiss of α with a non atomic
derivation Π2. Then one of the other cases applies with Π2 in place of Π 1.
6. Π 1 ends with an EM1 rule instance β and its conclusion is not simple. α cannot be
an atomic rule instance since one of its premisses is the conclusion of β which is
not simple and thus not atomic. If α is an elimination rule instance we can apply the
EM1´perm reduction to α and β. Thus there is a head-cut at the end of the principal
branches of Π , and Π satisfies the statement. Otherwise, if α is an EM1 rule instance
then the conclusions of Π and Π 1 are occurrences of the same non-simple formula.
Therefore Π again satisfies the statement.
Since we exhausted all the possible cases we are done. [\
Proof of ??.
Proof. The hypotheses rule out most of the cases considered by ??. The only possible
cases are:
1. Π ends with an introduction rule instance,
2. Π is atomic.
Since A is simple it is either an atomic or existentially quantified formula. If A is atomic,
Π cannot end with an introduction rule instance and thus Π must be atomic. Otherwise,
if A is existentially quantified, Π cannot end with an atomic rule instance and thus Π
must end with an introduction rule instance which can only be a DI rule instance. [\
Fig. 3. The permutative reductions of the EM1 rule with the ^E,_E and Ñ E rules.
EM1{^´perm
r@x. Psα
Π1
A1 ^ A2
r Prx ≔ yssα
Π2
A1 ^ A2EM1 αA1 ^ A2
^E Ai
Ñ
r@x. Psα
Π1
A1 ^ A2
^E Ai
r Prx ≔ yssα
Π2
A1 ^ A2
^E AiEM1 αAi
EM1{_´perm
r@x. Psβ
Σ1
A1 _ A2
r Prx ≔ yssβ
Σ2
A1 _ A2EM1 βA1 _ A2
rA1sα
Π1
B
rA2sα
Π2
B
_E αB
Ó
r@x. Psβ
Σ1
A1 _ A2
rA1sα
Π1
B
rA2sα
Π2
B
_E αB
r Prx ≔ yssβ
Σ2
A1 _ A2
rA1sα
Π1
B
rA2sα
Π2
B
_E αBEM1 βB
EM1{Ñ´perm
r@x. Psα
Π1
A1 Ñ A2
r Prx ≔ yssα
Π2
A1 Ñ A2EM1 αA1 Ñ A2
Σ
A1
^E A2
Ó
r@x. Psα
Π1
A1 Ñ A2
Σ
A1
Ñ E A2
r Prx ≔ yssα
Π2
A1 Ñ A2
Σ
A1
Ñ E A2EM1 αA2
Fig. 4. The permutative reductions of the EM1 rule with the @E and DE rules.
EM1{@´perm
r@x. Psα
Π1
@x. A
r Prx ≔ yssα
Π2
@x. AEM1 α
@x. A
@E
Arx ≔ ts
{
r@x. Psα
Π1
@x. A
@E
Arx ≔ ts
r Prx ≔ yssα
Π2
@x. A
@E
Arx ≔ ts
EM1 αArx ≔ ts
EM1{@´perm
rΣs
r@x. Psα
Π1
Dx. A
r Prx ≔ yssα
Π2
Dx. AEM1 α
Dx. A
rArx ≔ yss
B
DE B
Ó
rΣs
r@x. Psα
Π1
Dx. A
rArx ≔ yss
B
DE B
r Prx ≔ yssα
Π2
Dx. A
rArx ≔ yssβ
Σ
B
DE βBEM1 αB
